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LEGISLATING TO GIVE EFFECT TO PRECEDENT AUTONOMY: 








This article considers the legislative responses to the perceived need to provide for the 
binding force of precedent autonomy in Austria, Germany and England. It reflects 
comparatively upon the impact of these responses in considering to what extent it is possible 
to make an anticipatory refusal of consent to medical treatment that will bind healthcare 
professionals, as opposed to being merely a factor to be considered in determining the 
patient’s best interests or presumed will. It concludes that each of the three legislatures has 
introduced significant hurdles to the creation of a binding anticipatory decision, ensuring that 
medical discretion and the presumption in favour of life will be preserved in the majority of 




During the past fifty years, the nature of the doctor-patient relationship has moved 
from a medical paternalism paradigm to one that stresses the importance of patient autonomy 
and adopts a model of shared decision-making. Within this model, doctors play a pivotal role 
in providing information and expertise to enable patients to make effective choices about the 
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medical care and treatment they receive. This shift in perspective from ‘doctor knows best’ to 
patient autonomy is made more important by the fact that, with improvements in medical 
science and advanced medical knowledge, death is now often the result of a decision to 
withhold or withdraw treatment; a decision that will ultimately depend upon what may be 
regarded as a acceptable quality of life in relation to the patient concerned. It is common 
ground that ‘every person’s body is inviolate’1 and that an adult patient with the requisite 
capacity may refuse medical treatment, including life-sustaining treatment.2 This ensures that 
such decisions are made by patients themselves, in accordance with their own values and 
judgements about what constitutes an acceptable quality of life. However, the logical 
extension of this principle is that individuals with capacity should also be empowered to 
exercise precedent autonomy, making choices during times of capacity that take effect in the 
future where the individual lacks the capacity to make a contemporaneous decision, rather 
than treatment being provided in accordance with the patient’s best interests or presumed will 
as assessed by a third party.  
The principle of patient autonomy stresses respect for the patient as an individual, 
rather than as an object of concern, and attempts to promote precedent autonomy aim to 
extend that respect to those no longer capable of exercising autonomy and so to prioritise the 
patient’s wishes over her3 welfare. An important mechanism for conveying precedent 
autonomy is an advance directive, an instrument designed to act as a communication bridge, 
bridging the occurrence of incapacity and providing a clear statement of how the patient 
wants to be treated, or more usually what treatment the patient does not wish to be afforded. 
However, whilst an important tool, an advance directive is a mono-directional form of 
communication that takes effect only once the patient lacks capacity and is therefore no 
longer able to discuss alternative treatment and care options, to clarify her wishes, or indeed 
potentially to rescind her previously expressed wishes.  
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Anticipatory decision-making offers great promise and could make a substantial 
contribution to the empowerment of those lacking capacity, but there are important 
asymmetries between anticipatory and contemporaneous decision-making, asymmetries with 
the potential to undermine both the legal and moral authority of an advance directive. At one 
level obvious practical problems exist, including how to ensure that the anticipatory decision 
was voluntary and that the individual had capacity to make the decision. In addition, 
Buchanan and Brock identified four significant problems associated with anticipatory 
decisions that distinguish them from contemporaneous decisions and undermine the moral 
authority of advance directives.4 The first two problems acknowledge the inherent difficulty 
in drafting an advance directive to take effect at a future time when, depending upon the 
current health of the patient, the range of treatment scenarios and treatment available are 
inherently unpredictable and advances in medical science may have significantly altered the 
treatment options. Thirdly, at the time the directive should come into operation, an 
individual’s interests may be radically and unforeseeably different from those anticipated. 
Finally, they recognised that the ‘informal safeguards that tend to restrain imprudent or 
unreasonable contemporaneous choices by a competent individual are not likely to be 
present, or if present to be as effective’ in relation to an anticipatory choice.5  
Each of the abovementioned problems is inextricably linked to the temporal and 
psychological distance that separates the anticipatory decision from the time at which it 
should be implemented. However, it is suggested that such problems can be resolved by the 
introduction of suitably stringent safeguards determining the criteria for validity and 
(continuing) applicability of advance directives, together with an understanding of the true 
nature of autonomy. Autonomy’s central premise is that individuals should be permitted to 
make decisions for themselves, but the corollary to this must be that individuals must be able 
to make decisions contrary to their own best interests that they might later regret and that 
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choosing to exercise autonomy in anticipation of incapacity involves accepting responsibility 
for that choice. Nevertheless, the validity and authority of anticipatory decision-making calls 
into question the interplay of two potentially conflicting interests—that of society in 
upholding the sanctity of life and the patient’s right to self-determination. In considering this 
potential for conflict courts have stressed that in cases of doubt the sanctity of life must 
prevail.6 Therefore any attempt to give legal force to precedent autonomy must institute 
suitable safeguards, but at the same time do so in such a manner as to achieve a balance 
between respect for the sanctity of life and self-determination, ensuring that the safeguards do 
not render the right to make an anticipatory choice and to expect that choice to be 
implemented merely illusionary.  
Against this background, this article considers recent legislation7 enacted in Austria, 
Germany and England and Wales which sought to clarify the standing of advance decision-
making and to promote legal certainty by providing statutory recognition of the importance 
and binding nature of at least some advance decisions. Prior to the introduction of these Acts 
judicial, legislative and professional support for the binding nature of advance directives 
could be discerned in each of the jurisdictions. However, concern existed as to whether such 
anticipatory refusals of treatment would bind healthcare professionals, or were merely a 
factor to be considered in determining the patient’s best interests (in England and Wales) or 
her presumed will (in Germany and Austria) and thus that treatment could be afforded to the 
patient lacking capacity despite the existence of an applicable directive. This lack of clarity 
impinged upon patients and healthcare professionals alike, therefore, in each of the 
jurisdictions it was decided that legislation should be introduced to give statutory recognition 
to binding anticipatory refusals, rather than leaving the issue to the vagaries of the common 
law. In England and Wales and Germany this was achieved within the broader legislative 
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context relating to those lacking capacity; in Austria legislation relating specifically to 
advance directives was introduced.  
Whilst sharing the same aim of empowering patients, the maxim, in dubio pro vita 
can be seen to have greatly influenced the three legislatures to the extent that it must be 
questioned whether, through the imposition of weighty (and in some cases expensive) 
safeguards, the legislation adopted pays more than lip service to precedent autonomy, 
rendering the ability to create a binding advance decision little more than an unattainable 
ideal. This article will consider the legislative responses to the perceived need to provide for 
the binding force of precedent autonomy in the individual jurisdictions, then reflect 
comparatively upon the impact of these responses, considering to what extent it is possible, in 
each of these jurisdictions to make an anticipatory refusal of medical treatment that will bind 
healthcare professionals. It is concluded that each of the three legislatures has introduced 
significant hurdles to the creation of a binding anticipatory decision, ensuring that medical 
discretion and the presumption in favour of life will be preserved in the majority of cases. 
 
I THE THREE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO THE PERCEIVED NEED FOR 
LEGISLATION TO GIVE EFFECT TO PRECEDENT AUTONOMY 
 
1) England and Wales (hereafter England)8 
 
a) Background to the Act 
 
It has long been recognised that an adult patient with capacity may refuse medical 
treatment, including that which furthers her own best interests and life-sustaining medical 
treatment9 for ‘any reason, rational or irrational, or for no reason at all.’10 Treatment provided 
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contrary to such a refusal will expose the healthcare professional to both criminal and tortious 
liability for battery.11 By contrast, in the case of a patient lacking capacity, absent a valid 
advance decision or the existence of a proxy decision-maker12 empowered by the patient to 
take such decisions, the patient must be treated in accordance with her best interests.13 
Although the assessment of best interests does incorporate consideration of the patient’s 
previously expressed wishes and the values and beliefs she held while she had capacity,14 
these are merely factors to be considered, rather than determinative of treatment decisions.  
Prior to the introduction of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA) the courts had 
recognised that an advance refusal could bind healthcare professionals in a similar manner to 
that given contemporaneously, but stressed that in the case of anticipatory refusals an added 
degree of care is required to ensure that the patient’s anticipatory refusal is valid, indicating 
that more stringent requirements may be applied to the exercise of precedent autonomy.15 
Largely in keeping with the Law Commission’s proposals,16 the MCA effectively codified 
the existing common law, recognising that an individual can make a valid and binding 
advance refusal of treatment, including life-sustaining treatment, that will take effect if she 
later lacks the capacity to make a contemporaneous decision. Nevertheless, it is argued that 
the Act limits the opportunity to exercise precedent autonomy by imposing a number of 
limitations upon the scope of anticipatory decision-making and by leaving a substantial 
degree of discretion to a healthcare professional to determine whether or not an advance 
decision is binding. 
 
b) An examination of the new law regulating advance directives 
 
i) Initial validity and applicability 
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The ability to exercise precedent autonomy is restricted to advance refusals of 
treatment made by an adult aged eighteen or over with capacity: s.24(1) MCA. In relation to 
contemporaneous decision-making, although a minor’s age17 and/or understanding18 is crucial 
in determining whether a minor can consent to medical treatment in her own right, the courts 
have consistently held that a refusal of consent to treatment adjudged to accord with her best 
interests is subject to recidivism by a parental responsibility holder or the court.19 When it is 
considered that a mature minor may be capable of fulfilling the capacity criteria set out in the 
Act, it seems rather arbitrary to exclude the possibility of her making an advance decision on 
the sole criterion of age. Thus the failure to provide for a mature minor’s ability to make an 
advance decision should be seen as a missed opportunity for the legislature to correct the 
overly paternalistic approach adopted by the courts to minors and the treatment thereof, 
particularly given that the Act generally applies to those aged sixteen and over, rather than 
merely adults.20  
In relation to adults, the validity of a refusal of treatment is dependent upon the 
individual being deemed to have the capacity to make the relevant treatment decision at the 
time it was made. The Act defines incapacity as the inability to make a decision21 as the result 
of the individual being unable to ‘understand the information relevant to the decision, to 
retain that information, to use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the 
decision, or to communicate his decision.’22 Thus a functional test of capacity is adopted; 
capacity is decision specific, but as was recognised in Re T the patient must have the requisite 
capacity for the decision in hand, whereby the graver the circumstances, the higher the degree 
of capacity required will be.23 It is worth noting that a much higher degree of capacity will be 
required to refuse medically-indicated life-sustaining treatment, than would be required to 
consent to it due to the attendant consequences.  
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Whilst the Act maintains its link with the common law in perpetuating the 
presumption of capacity,24 when the impact of s.26(2) MCA is considered it would appear 
that in fact the general presumption of capacity may not apply to advance refusals. When the 
time comes for implementation of an advance decision, attending doctors are required to 
satisfy themselves of its validity,25 an assessment that will include a retrospective 
consideration of whether the patient had the capacity to make the decision at the time of 
drafting, rather than simply presuming that to be the case. The Code of Practice and the GMC 
guidance require doctors to specifically consider whether patients had the requisite capacity, 
but stress that a doctor should presume that to be the case unless there are grounds for 
doubt.26 Nevertheless, a key deficit in the MCA, is that it does not require an assessment of 
capacity at the time the advance decision is formulated, a requirement that would form an 
important safeguard of the patient’s ability to exercise precedent autonomy, obviating any 
need for a retrospective capacity assessment at a time when the patient is unable to 
demonstrate that she possessed the requisite capacity at the time of drafting.  
Regarding the permissible scope of an advance decision, the MCA mirrors the 
common law relating to contemporaneous decisions, stressing that an advance decision may 
not be used to request assisted suicide or active euthanasia,27 and merely permitting 
individuals to refuse specific medical treatments in anticipation of incapacity. By limiting 
valid advance decisions to refusals of treatment, the Act preserves clinical judgement in terms 
of what treatment should be available to the patient,28 although treatment preferences 
expressed in an advance decision will fall to be considered under the assessment of best 
interests as expressions of the person’s past wishes. Thus, it is clear that the right to self-
determination in both the contemporaneous and anticipatory contexts is conceived of as a 
right to decide not to be treated, a right to defend one’s bodily integrity, but not a right to 
demand treatment.29  
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At common law it was accepted that all anticipatory decisions could be made in any 
manner, for example orally30 and through blinking.31 However, the MCA imposes a form 
requirement upon anticipatory refusals of life-sustaining treatment, requiring such refusals to 
be set down in writing; be signed by the individual, or someone acting on her behalf in her 
presence, and witnessed; and to include a specific statement that the refusal is intended to 
operate even if life is at risk.32 As the majority of advance decisions are designed to exclude 
life-sustaining treatment, most advance decisions will be required to be set down in writing. 
The imposition of a form requirement underscores the difference between anticipatory and 
contemporaneous refusals as no such requirement is imposed upon the latter. It also illustrates 
the preference for life that pervades the MCA, applying only to advance decisions to refuse 
life-sustaining treatments, defined by the Act as ‘treatment which in the view of a person 
providing health care for the person concerned is necessary to sustain life’.33 Nevertheless, it 
must be remembered that the determination of what will constitute life-sustaining treatment 
will largely depend upon the patient’s condition. Thus the relatively innocuous antibiotic 
could well constitute life-sustaining treatment in the case of a patient suffering from 
pneumonia.  
Following the stipulations set out in Re T by Lord Donaldson MR,34 in order to be 
effective the advance decision must specify the particular treatment to be refused, and the 
circumstances in which that refusal is to operate.35 However, s.24(1) MCA 2005 merely 
refers to ‘such circumstances as he may specify,’ suggesting that although there is an 
expectation that the scope of the refusal should be specified, that may not be a requirement 
for validity. The majority of advance directives will be necessarily abstract, being drafted 
with a view to determining treatment to be given or refused across a wide spectrum of clinical 
scenarios that may, or may not, eventuate. However, if the scope of the refusal is not defined 
in the advance decision it will be vulnerable to a finding that the individual did not intend it 
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to apply in the situation that arises. Despite the fact that the decision and scope thereof may 
be expressed in non-technical language this dual specificity requirement is likely to prove the 
most difficult criterion to satisfy, particularly in the case of patients who are not suffering 
from a degenerative disease with a known prognosis that enables likely treatment options and 
scenarios to be anticipated with a relatively high degree of certainty. 
 
ii) Continued validity and applicability 
 
Provided that the patient’s advance decision is valid and applicable to the treatment in 
question, the decision will have ‘effect as if he had made it, and had had capacity to make it, 
at the time when the question arises whether the treatment should be carried out or 
continued.’36 However, even if an advance refusal satisfies the eligibility criteria, the 
continued validity and applicability of the advance refusal must be considered. The Act 
stresses that an individual can revoke her advance refusal at any time whilst she has the 
capacity to do so.37 Revocation does not need to take any particular form so could, for 
example, consist of tearing up a written refusal. Additionally, intervening events may 
invalidate the advance decision. Three such circumstances are outlined in the Act. Firstly 
where the individual has subsequently created a lasting power of attorney and devolved 
power to the donee to consent or refuse consent to the treatment covered by the advance 
decision,38 positing the LPA as an alternative to an advance decision, rather than as playing a 
complementary role thereto as in Germany and Austria, discussed below. Secondly, an 
advance refusal may be invalidated if the patient has acted inconsistently with that decision 
since making it,39 for example by renouncing her religious faith which formed the basis of the 
advance decision.40 Finally, the advance decision may be found to be inapplicable due to the 
existence of reasonable grounds for believing that circumstances exist that the individual had 
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not anticipated, but which would have affected her decision.41 An example of such a 
circumstance would be where new, or improved therapeutic options have become available in 
the intervening period between the making of the advance decision and the time at which it 
falls to be implemented. As the Code of Practice makes clear, the longer the time between the 
making of the decision and the time for its implementation, the less likely it is that it will be 
found to be valid and applicable due to advances in medical science, or changes in the 
person’s life.42 Nevertheless, the Act does not impose any requirement that the advance 
decision be regularly reviewed and renewed, leaving this to the discretion of the patient.  
A further aspect of the perceived need for clarity was demonstrated by the British 
Medical Association’s call for legislation to ‘clarify the non-liability of doctors who act in 
accordance with an advance directive,’43 although arguably clarification of the liability of a 
doctor failing to act in accordance with an advance directive was equally important.  The Law 
Commission’s proposals applied the same standard of reasonable belief to both situations,44 
but it is suggested that the Act provides much greater security for healthcare professionals by 
adopting a differential standard designed to preserve medical discretion. S.26(3) MCA, 
confirms that whereas a doctor must only hold a reasonable belief that a valid and applicable 
advance decision exists in order to avoid liability for non-treatment, she will only incur 
liability for continuing the refused treatment if she is satisfied that the advance refusal is valid 
and applicable to the treatment. On this basis it would seem that a large degree of discretion 
is afforded to the healthcare professional to determine whether or not the advance decision is 
valid and applicable, should she have any doubt (in the sense that she is not entirely satisfied) 
she will be able to regard the refusal as merely indicative of the patient’s wishes.  
Therefore the MCA does recognise that an individual can create a valid advance 
decision that will bind healthcare professionals. However, other than the incorporation of a 
form requirement for advance refusals of life-sustaining treatment and the clarification of 
 12
implications of an advance decision for healthcare professionals, the Act merely codifies the 
existing common law. This leaves significant discretion to doctors to determine whether or 
not an advance decision is valid and applicable, but fails to provide clear guidance for, and 
control of, the exercise of this discretion. The Act does little to resolve the uncertainties 
regarding how specific the treatment refused and the scope of that refusal must be. Similarly, 
there is significant doubt about when an advance decision may be regarded as no longer 
representing the will of the patient and consequently be invalidated, reducing the status of the 
advance decision to that of an expression of the individual’s past wishes, just one of a number 
of factors to be considered in assessing whether treatment should be afforded as required by 




a) Background to the Act 
 
In relation to contemporaneous decision-making the law has long been settled in 
Germany—medical treatment will constitute a battery unless it is justified by law, necessity, 
or by the patient’s sufficiently informed consent.46 The requirement of consent reflects the 
recognition of three basic rights protected by the Grundgesetz (GG, German constitution): the 
right to self-determination (Art.2 I GG), to bodily integrity (Art.2 II GG) and the protection 
of human dignity (Art.1 I GG). The German courts have long recognised that these 
constitutional rights entitle an adult patient with capacity to refuse medical treatment, 
including life-sustaining treatment, for any reason and that the fact that a refusal of consent 
might be regarded as irrational or unwise will not invalidate the refusal.47  
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In the case of a patient lacking capacity, treatment may only be afforded to the extent 
that it complies with the patient’s presumed will; the determination of which is primarily a 
subjective assessment that includes consideration of the patient’s earlier oral and written 
statements, her religious faith, other personal values and her life expectancy.48 Like its North 
American counterpart the substituted judgement standard, the presumed will approach centres 
upon the patient’s presumed wishes, rather than her needs, arguably prioritising her dignity 
and autonomy to a greater extent than the English best interests approach. Whenever an adult 
is unable to manage her affairs due to mental illness, mental or physical incapacity, the 
Guardianship Court can appoint a Betreuer (guardian) to take responsibility for those areas 
that the individual is unable to manage herself, provided that the individual doesn’t already 
have a Bevollmächtigte (the equivalent of a someone with Lasting Power of Attorney in 
England)49 or other means of assistance rendering a Betreuer unnecessary.50 Thus, in almost 
every case where a patient lacks capacity and has not appointed a Bevollmächtigte, a Betreuer 
will have to be appointed for her by the court. In the absence of a valid and applicable 
advance directive, the Betreuer’s role is to both assess and implement the patient’s presumed 
will. By contrast, a Bevollmächtigte is appointed by the patient herself, at a time when she 
has the capacity to do so, and she will take the place of the patient, with the ability to consent 
or refuse consent to treatment on behalf of the patient. As will be considered below, both 
forms of legal representation play a central role in the new law in determining whether an 
advance directive is valid and applicable, rather than being regarded as an alternative method 
of making provision for future incapacity as in England. 
Prior to the introduction of the 3rd Law to Amend Guardianship Law 2009, the 
validity and applicability of advance directives was subject only to the common law. Whilst 
the English jurisprudence was quite settled prior to the enactment of the MCA, the position in 
Germany was rather confused as the Criminal and Civil Divisions of the Bundesgerichtshof 
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(the Supreme Court) had issued conflicting decisions in this area.51 In 1994, the 1st Criminal 
Division of the Bundesgerichtshof acknowledged the importance of previously expressed 
wishes, holding that they constitute important evidence of the patient’s presumed will. It held 
that if the patient is incurably ill and such statements clearly establish her will, they can 
justify the withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining treatment.52 By contrast, in 2003 the 
12th Civil Division of the Bundesgerichtshof53 recognised that advance directives are an 
independent expression of the patient’s will, rather than merely an indication of her presumed 
will. The court held that such expressions survive incapacity, provided they have not been 
revoked,54 obliging the Betreuer to give effect to anticipatory decisions that are applicable to 
the treatment and medical circumstances.55  
While significant due to the recognition of the independent and continuing force of an 
advance decision,56 the 12th Civil Division’s decision caused considerable confusion and was 
the subject of extensive criticism.57 Although the court accepted that treatment could be 
withdrawn from a patient lacking capacity if this corresponded to her anticipatory or 
presumed will, it expressed this as being the case when the patient’s underlying condition 
would irreversibly lead to death,58 rather than simply when the patient was incurably ill as 
held by the 1st Criminal Division. This confirmed that the patient did not have to actually be 
dying (in which case, as the Bundesgerichtshof had previously recognised, life-sustaining 
treatment would not be medically indicated),59 but it raised significant questions about what 
would constitute an underlying condition that would irreversibly lead to death? There is no 
requirement that a patient with capacity continue to consent to treatment until such a time as 
her condition could be said to be such as to inevitably lead to her death. However, this 
decision appeared to limit the permissible scope of an advance refusal of treatment, arguably 
rendering those in, for example, a persistent vegetative state passive ‘prisoners of medical 
technology’60 and those with a directive refusing blood transfusions on the basis of religious 
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beliefs liable to treatment. Additionally confusion arose concerning whether or not a Betreuer 
would need to obtain Guardianship Court approval of her decision to refuse consent to 
treatment on the basis of a valid and applicable advance directive. The 1st Criminal Division 
had suggested that such a duty would exist in all cases where medically indicated treatment 
was to be withdrawn.61 By contrast, the 12th Civil Division stated that approval would only be 
necessary in the case of conflict between doctors and the Betreuer as to whether indicated 
treatment should be withdrawn, but recommended that legislation recognising the role of the 
Guardianship Court at the end of life was necessary.62  
Due to the confusion created by the conflicting jurisprudence the Federal Minister for 
Justice established a working party ‘Patient Autonomy at the End of Life’ to consider 
whether legislation relating to advance directives was necessary; it answered in the 
affirmative citing a lack of legal clarity.63 This finding was echoed by the Parliamentary 
Commission on Ethics in Modern Medicine which recommended that legislation was 
necessary to resolve the uncertainty faced by doctors, Betreuers, Bevollmächtigten and 
Guardianship Courts about the application of advance directives.64 The path to legislation 
was long, but finally the German Parliament passed the 3rd Law to Amend Guardianship Law 
in 2009, amending the provisions relating to guardianship in the BGB (German Civil Code) 
by providing for the binding force of advance directives therein, rather than as a separate area 
of law. 
 
b) An examination of the new law regulating advance directives 
 
i) Initial validity and applicability  
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§1901a I BGB, as amended, makes provision for the binding effect of valid and 
applicable advance directives, making it clear that only adults with capacity to consent may 
execute an advance directive. As the regulation of advance directives is anchored in 
guardianship law, it follows that only an adult can make a valid advance directive, because 
only an adult is capable of being placed under guardianship or appointing a Bevollmächtigte. 
However, the fact that the ability to exercise precedent autonomy is restricted to adults does 
mean that the wishes of even a mature minor can only be considered as part of an assessment 
of her presumed will and hence that her ability to exercise her constitutional right to self-
determination is severely restricted. Capacity is, as in England, decision-specific and requires 
that the patient be able to understand the type, meaning and consequences, including risks, of 
the proposed intervention and be able to make a decision upon the basis of that 
understanding.65  
The advance directive must consent or refuse consent to specific medical treatments, 
clinical investigations or medical interventions and set out the circumstances in which the 
decision is to take effect. Therefore, unlike the MCA, §1901a I BGB also provides for 
anticipatory consent. However, like the MCA the German law does not require a person 
drafting an advance directive to take medical advice. This is a significant omission in the 
German context because, under German law, a consent to medical treatment is only valid if it 
is sufficiently informed, or if medical advice has been rejected.66 Thus, the Bill’s explanatory 
notes recommend that medical advice should be sought, or that explicit reference should be 
made in the directive that the individual waived such advice.67  
A permissible anticipatory decision finds its limits in the same boundaries applied to 
contemporaneous decisions, hence a request for active euthanasia would be invalid as killing 
on request is prohibited by §216 StGB (Strafgesetzbuch, Penal Code). Similarly, as the 
Bundesgerichtshof stressed, the limits of a patient’s ability to consent are dictated by the 
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doctor’s assessment of what treatments and investigations are clinically indicated; if the 
doctor forms the view that the treatment consented to in the advance directive is not clinically 
indicated, the patient’s consent will be irrelevant.68 Therefore, as in England, an advance 
directive cannot be used to mandate treatment. A significant advantage of the new regulation 
is that it sets an end to the confusion created by the 12th Civil Division of the 
Bundesgerichtshof in establishing that the validity of advance directives is not dependent 
upon the type or stage of the patient’s illness, §1901a III BGB. This provision was introduced 
in conformity with the recommendation of the National Ethics Council’s majority opinion69 
that such a limitation would impose an unacceptable restriction upon the individual’s right to 
self-determination. 
Like the approach adopted by the English courts, the Bundesgerichtshof had 
suggested that oral statements given in anticipation of incapacity would suffice,70 however 
§1901a I BGB requires that advance directives be written. This form requirement is to be 
interpreted in line with the general civil law provision found in §126 I BGB, thus the advance 
directive need not be handwritten and a pre-prepared form may be utilised. The directive 
must be signed by the individual, or if that is not physically possible it must be notarised. The 
introduction of form requirement serves once more to underline the restricted scope of 
anticipatory decision-making when compared to its contemporaneous counterpart.  
 
ii) Continued validity and applicability 
 
The BGB as amended provides for the binding effect of an advance directive, 
however, it does require an incapacitated patient to have either a Betreuer or a 
Bevollmächtigte to assess the validity and applicability of the advance directive. If the initial 
requirements are fulfilled the patient’s legal representative71 must examine the advance 
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directive and satisfy herself that it is applicable to the patient’s current life and treatment 
situation and that it still represents the patient’s will. In line with the jurisprudence of the 
Bundesgerichtshof,72 no requirement to renew the advance directive is imposed upon the 
individual—she is entitled to expect her directive to remain in force unless or until she 
revokes it, revocation being possible at any time and in any manner, §1901a I BGB. 
However, the legal representative is required to assure herself that not only has the patient not 
revoked her advance directive, but also that the patient’s life circumstances and wishes have 
not changed during the intervening period. This assessment will include considering concrete 
indications that the patient no longer wishes her advance directive to apply as well as whether 
the patient would have decided differently now if she were able to.  
In assessing whether or not the advance directive is valid and applicable, the Act 
requires the legal representative to enter into a dialogue with the doctor, §1901b I BGB. As 
the Bundesgerichtshof stressed, the question of consent will only arise in relation to treatment 
that is clinically indicated.73 §1901b I BGB recognises that the doctor’s role is first to 
consider what treatment is clinically indicated, then to discuss with the patient’s legal 
representative whether or not that treatment would correspond to the patient’s advance 
directive, emphasising that a dialogue between the doctor and the legal representative is 
central to the legislative scheme regulating advance directives. Moreover, recognition is 
afforded to the wider social context of decision-making through the requirement that the legal 
representative consult with close friends and family of the patient in assessing the 
applicability and validity of the advance directive, or to clearly establish the patient’s 
presumed will if no such directive is available, §1901b II BGB. However, this form of social 
control will only be possible where the consultation will not occasion considerable delay and 
the focus of the consultation must be to determine and give effect to the patient’s anticipatory 
decision, not to undermine it.74 
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If the legal representative can assure herself that the validity and applicability 
requirements are met, the advance directive will bind the legal representative, who is then 
obliged to communicate the (refusal of) consent on behalf of the patient and to implement the 
directive,75 there is no scope for her to substitute her own decision for that of the patient.76 If 
the directive is not applicable to the patient’s current situation, it will fall to be considered by 
her legal representative in determining the patient’s presumed will. In such cases the legal 
representative must refer to the (non-exhaustive) checklist contained in §1901a II BGB, 
considering the patient’s earlier ‘oral or written statements, ethical or religious convictions 
and other personal values’ in determining whether or not to consent to treatment in 
accordance with the patient’s presumed will. If there is no concrete evidence that the patient’s 
presumed will would require a refusal of treatment, the legal representative should consent to 
medicallyindicated treatment—in case of doubt the preference for life will prevail.77 
The new regulation provides clarity about when an application for approval must be 
made to the Guardianship Court and applies the same rules to both Betreuers and 
Bevollmächtigten.78 Unlike a Betreuer, a Bevollmächtigte is generally not subject to court 
supervision. Thus, whilst this may provide clarity, it effects a significant deviation from the 
enhanced status of the Bevollmächtigte and raises questions of appropriateness given that a 
Bevollmächtigte is appointed by the patient herself, specifically to take the decision whether 
or not to consent to life-sustaining treatment on her behalf (in accordance with her advance 
directive or other wishes). By contrast, a Betreuer is appointed by the court and may not have 
had a relationship with the patient based upon the same level of trust. Given the significant 
distinction between the two types of legal representative, it is difficult to justify applying the 
same rules to both,79 particularly as the BGB does not envisage the Guardianship Court 
exercising oversight over all non-treatment decisions. As §1904 IV BGB makes clear, 
approval from the Guardianship Court need only be sought in cases of conflict between the 
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doctor and legal representative. If the doctor and legal representative agree that the patient’s 
advance directive is valid and applicable, and thus that the decision therein is binding upon 
them both, there is no need for court approval; the same rule applies to the presumed will as 
determined by the legal representative. In the case of disagreement between the doctor and 
the legal representative, an application must be made to the Guardianship Court for approval 
of the legal representative’s decision. The court’s role is limited to considering whether or not 
the legal representative’s decision accurately reflects the patient’s will, if so the court must 
approve the decision, §1904 III BGB.  
The limited nature of the control function allocated to the court raises real questions 
given that the justification provided for court involvement does not relate to enabling a legal 
representative to compel a doctor to implement the patient’s wishes, but rather is based on the 
need to protect the patient’s life and right to self-determination, as outlined by the 
Bundesgerichtshof in 2003.80 Nevertheless, the control instance is only required by virtue of 
the dissens between the doctor and representative, reflecting the notion that in such cases the 
principle of in dubio pro vita requires court adjudication. The explanatory notes posit that 
court oversight is not required where the doctor and legal representative agree on the will of 
the patient as the doctor and legal representative are expected to act as a check and balance 
upon one another and that absent a suspicion of abuse there can be no justification for such 
proceedings with the inevitable delay that would entail for implementing the patient’s will.81 
This reasoning seems unconvincing—if there is a need for court involvement to protect the 
patient’s life and right to self-determination where doctors and legal representatives disagree, 
that same need is not obviated simply because the two parties agree that treatment should be 
withdrawn or withheld. Arguably the fact that the doctor and legal representative agree about 
whether treatment should be provided does not mean that the representative’s decision truly 
reflects what the patient wanted, it may reflect their own subjective values of the sufficiency 
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of the patient’s quality of life. However the restriction of mandatory court oversight to cases 
of disagreement reflects a pragmatic attempt to balance the need for protection of life against 
the needs to facilitate precedent autonomy without undue delay and to avoid overburdening 
the Guardianship Courts. Moreover, the required involvement of family and close friends in 
the dialogue to establish what the patient would have wanted should introduce an additional 
control measure into the process and it remains possible for third parties who suspect abuse to 
petition the Guardianship Court to review the legal representative’s decision to refuse 
treatment.82 Indeed a secondary function of the Guardianship Court would appear to be to 
legitimise the legal representative’s decision, safeguarding her from potential criminal 
proceedings in respect of the decision, and to provide clarity and legal certainty for the 
medical personnel required to withdraw or withhold the life-sustaining treatment.83 
The 3rd Law to Amend Guardianship Law has clarified many of the existing concerns 
relating to the applicability and effect of advance directives. It is now clear that an advance 
directive can contain a valid refusal of life-sustaining treatment, regardless of whether the 
patient is suffering from an irreversible condition that will lead to death. However, questions 
remain about how specific the advance directive must be and about when it will apply. A key 
feature of the German regulatory response to the problems arising from advance directives is 
that the patient’s legal representative acting together with the doctor, rather than the doctor 
alone, must determine the applicability of the advance directive, ensuring that the 
interpretation of the advance directive, or indeed the patient’s presumed will, is not simply 




a) Background to the Act  
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In Austria, just as in England and Germany, a sufficiently informed consent is a pre-
requisite to lawful medical treatment and a patient may refuse consent to treatment, including 
life-sustaining treatment.85 However, unlike the other two jurisdictions under consideration, 
the Austrian Penal Code contains a specific offence of providing unauthorised treatment that 
will be committed by a doctor who treats a patient without consent, absent an emergency 
situation, even if that treatment accords with professional standards.86 Therefore, treatment 
provided without a valid consent will constitute a crime, but it is a crime with a significant 
difference—§110 III ÖStGB states that the accused is only to be prosecuted at the behest of 
the patient who was treated without consent. Thus, if the patient dies no prosecution can be 
brought and, if she survives, she (or her legal representative acting on her behalf) must 
instigate proceedings within six weeks of becoming aware of the unauthorised treatment. 
This renders the offence almost meaningless, at least in terms of likely prosecution. 
Furthermore, unlike the position in England and Germany, no action will lie for battery (§88 
ÖStGB) in the case of non-consensual indicated treatment, unless the treatment was not 
provided in accordance with professional standards.87 
The Patientenverfügungs-Gesetz (PatVG) is a single issue Act, regulating only 
advance directives. Prior to the Act, advance directives were specifically addressed by two 
separate pieces of legislation. §10 VII KAKuG88 imposed a duty upon medical institutions to 
document a patient’s advance directive refusing specific medical treatment in her medical 
notes, so that in the case of future incapacity account could be taken of those wishes. 
Similarly, Art.18 Patients’ Charter stated that patients have the right to make anticipatory 
refusals of consent so that future medical decisions can take account of such wishes as far as 
possible.89 Therefore, medical institutions were required to document advance directives and 
to take them into account, but they were not required to follow them. There was also no 
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substantial judicial authority to support the binding effect of advance directives. The only 
Austrian Supreme Court decision90 to consider advance directives did so in the context of a 
psychiatric directive and did not consider the possible binding effect of a directive as the 
individual concerned had clearly not had the requisite capacity to complete the directive, 
enabling the court to leave the question of the validity and impact of anticipatory decision-
making for another day. Thus, prior to the PatVG there was no clarity about whether advance 
directives might be capable of binding doctors, or whether they were simply an indication of 
the patient’s presumed will. The PatVG established a two-tier system of advance directives, 
with varying requirements.91 At one end of the scale, the binding directive comes at a high 
price (in the literal sense), with mandatory legal and medical counselling, form and renewal 
requirements; by contrast much less stringent requirements are imposed upon what is termed 
a directive to be considered.  
 
b) An examination of the new law regulating advance directives 
 
i) Initial validity and applicability 
 
Some general provisions apply to both forms of directive, the most important of 
which is that the patient must have capacity at the time of making the advance directive. Just 
as in England and Germany, there is a general presumption of capacity, which may be 
rebutted, and capacity is decision-specific.92 The PatVG does not define capacity, but does 
refer to the individual requiring both ‘Einsichts-’ (understanding) and ‘Urteils-’ (judgement) 
capacity—the capacity standard applicable to medical treatment in both Germany and 
Austria. Thus, as in England and Germany, in order to have capacity the patient must be able 
to understand the type, meaning and consequences, including risks, of the proposed 
 24
intervention and be able to make a decision upon the basis of that understanding.93 However, 
in contrast to the German and English provisions, the PatVG does not limit the ability to 
execute an advance directive to adults, reflecting the general Austrian legal position of 
children in relation to consent to medical treatment. As the Austrian Civil Code (ABGB) 
recognises, in the case of a minor with the necessary capacity only she can consent to medical 
treatment and capacity is to be assumed in the case of mature minors.94 In practice, this 
means that a minor can consent, or indeed refuse consent to medical treatment from the age 
of fourteen. A holder of parental responsibility may override a minor’s consent to treatment, 
but there is no equivalent provision for overriding a refusal of treatment.95 Thus, a minor will 
be able to execute a binding advance directive, subject to fulfilling the other statutory 
requirements. Moreover, if the child has been certified as having capacity by a doctor during 
the mandatory medical advice session discussed below, it will not be possible to rebut the 
presumption of capacity set out in §146c I ABGB .96 
In line with the earlier statutory provisions, §2 I PatVG makes it clear that advance 
directives can consist only of advance refusals of medical care. An individual may include a 
statement of wishes regarding treatment she would like within her directive, but such positive 
wishes will only be relevant to any consideration of her presumed will, they will have no 
binding effect. Therefore, in common with the English legal position, the Austrian Act does 
not permit patients to give a binding anticipatory consent to treatment, rather patients are 
limited to refusing clinically indicated medical care.  Although an advance directive may 
include a refusal of life-sustaining treatment, the Austrian Parliament stressed that the PatVG 
was not the first step to legalising active euthanasia, indeed the Act specifically excludes the 
validity of advance directives that are contrary to criminal law.97  
If an individual wishes her advance directive to be binding, significant requirements 
must be met. Firstly, the medical care refused must be described in concrete terms, or must be 
 25
clear from the context of the directive as a whole.98 The explanatory notes recognise that it 
would be unrealistic to expect individuals to draw up a comprehensive list of all possible 
forms of medical care that they would like to refuse, however the notes do stress that general 
refusals, for example of artificial means to prolong life, will not suffice.99 Moreover, §5 
PatVG requires that the refusal of medical care be fully informed. This is achieved via 
mandatory medical advice, whereby a doctor is required to comprehensively inform the 
patient about the nature and consequences of her advance directive. As the explanatory notes 
make clear, this is not limited to discussing the effect of refusing a particular treatment, but 
should also include a discussion of the alternatives.100 Therefore, by requiring patients to 
partake of comprehensive medical advice, the Act aims to ensure that binding directives are 
clear and based on a sound knowledge of the medical situations which may arise. 
Nevertheless, it is questionable whether comprehensive medical advice is appropriate, or 
indeed even possible, where the patient is healthy and not suffering from a particular disease 
with a known prognosis. Similarly, a Jehovah’s Witness who wishes to create a binding 
advance directive refusing blood and blood products in all circumstances is unlikely to 
require comprehensive medical information about the consequences of this choice. This 
requirement represents an important distinction from contemporaneous refusals of treatment 
which may be given without medical advice–whereas the validity of a contemporary consent 
to treatment will depend upon it being sufficiently informed, no such a requirement is applied 
to contemporaneous refusals of consent.101 Thus, as Memmer contends what is generally 
regarded as a right to be informed, has been transformed into a duty to be informed in the 
context of advance directives.102 It may be argued that the mandatory medical advice will 
improve the quality of anticipatory decision-making, but it is important to note that the 
provision of this mandatory medical advice and certification will not constitute normal 
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medical services and will therefore not be covered by health insurance, hence patients are 
required to pay for this ‘service’ as a necessary step to creating a binding advance directive. 
In the course of the medical advice, the doctor must not only ensure that the patient’s 
anticipatory refusal is informed, she must also both certify that the patient has correctly 
understood the consequences of her directive and set out the reasons why the patient’s 
understanding is considered correct. Consequently, whereas a contemporaneous refusal of 
treatment can be given for any reason, or indeed for no specified reason, an anticipatory 
refusal will require justification. §5 PatVG refers to such reasons as being ‘perhaps because 
they draw upon a treatment connected to an earlier or current illness of the patient or one of 
her close relatives.’ The explanatory notes repeat this formulation, but suggest that other 
justifications could be based on lengthy professional experience of particular clinical 
conditions which enable a patient to say that she would not want a particular treatment, or 
refusals based on religious views.103 Therefore it is clear that, in contrast to the rules 
pertaining to contemporaneous decisions, the patient must explain why she does not want to 
receive a particular treatment and that the doctor must be satisfied that those reasons are 
sufficient to ground a valid refusal. This highlights the difference between contemporaneous 
and anticipatory decision-making and suggests that the doctor may have a role in determining 
what constitutes an appropriate reason for refusing treatment. In addition, the doctor must 
certify that the patient has the necessary capacity to execute an advance directive. This 
represents a key benefit introduced by the Austrian Act obviating the need for the attending 
doctor to consider whether or not the patient had the requisite capacity to refuse medical care 
at the time of drafting, an assessment which is likely to prove problematic in both Germany 
and England.  
In addition to the mandatory medical advice, the Act compels a patient to receive 
legal instruction104 about the consequences of her directive and the possibility of revocation; 
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and requires that the directive must be in a written format and signed and dated in the 
presence of a legal adviser following such instruction. A simple reading of §6 PatVG would 
suggest that the instruction provided will be purely legal, but the explanatory notes make it 
clear that the distinction between legal and medical advice is somewhat blurred. Recognising 
that advance directives will always require interpretation, the explanatory notes state that the 
purpose of the legal advice is firstly to ensure that the directive is clear and corresponds to the 
Act’s requirements; and secondly to provide information about the legal consequences of the 
directive for the patient, namely that the directive will usually be binding upon the doctor 
even if the patient will die as a result of an anticipatory refusal of medically indicated life-
sustaining treatment. Moreover, the instruction should include discussion of the possibility of 
creating a non-binding directive.105  
Whilst information concerning the legal consequences of a directive can legitimately 
be provided by a legal adviser, it is difficult to see why legal advice is required to ensure 
clarity of expression in the directive itself—surely that is a matter for the medical advice 
session, where the doctor could reasonably expect to clarify the meaning of terms used and 
the implications thereof. As Bernat correctly notes, if a person is in need of clarification 
regarding the consequences of her advance directive, it is difficult to suggest that she has the 
requisite understanding to make it in the first place!106 Given the cost involved in obtaining 
legal instruction, provision is made in the Act for that instruction to be provided not only by a 
lawyer or notary, but also by a legally trained employee of the regional patients’ ombudsmen, 
some of which provide such legal advice free of charge. However, if the patient is physically 
unable to sign the advance directive it will need to be notarised in accordance with §886 
ABGB, and if the patient wishes to combine her advance directive with a Lasting Power of 
Attorney with the power to refuse life-sustaining treatment it can only be created by a notary 
or a lawyer (§284f III ABGB), inevitably incurring legal fees. The legal adviser must certify 
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on the directive, or in an appendix thereto, that the legal instruction has taken place, but is not 
required to confirm the individual’s capacity, that is a matter reserved for the doctor 
providing the medical advice/information.  
 
ii) Continued validity and applicability 
 
As the legal adviser must make clear to the patient during the legal instruction 
required for a binding directive,107 a patient may revoke a directive at any time and in any 
manner, §10 II PatVG. According to the explanatory notes, in an exception to the general law 
relating to declarations of will, capacity will not be required to revoke an advance 
directive.108 The notes provide no explanation of why an exception to the general civil law 
rules applies to the case of advance directives, and the Act itself makes no reference to such 
an exception. Given that capacity is required to create an advance directive, it is submitted 
that the patient will need at least a very limited degree of capacity in order to revoke her 
advance directive, particularly if it is categorised as a binding directive.109 Indeed. the Federal 
Ministry of Health’s guidelines for doctors concerning the creation and use of advance 
directives state that full capacity in the sense of capacity to understand and make judgements 
based upon that understanding is not required, but that ‘a certain—even if only limited—
capacity to make decisions’ will be necessary for an effective revocation.110 
The fact that the advance directive must be signed and dated by the patient in the 
presence of her legal adviser is important because the validity of advance directives is time-
limited. According to §7 PatVG, the binding effect of an advance directive will automatically 
expire five years after it was executed, the only exception being where the patient has lost the 
capacity to renew the directive during that timeframe. A directive may be renewed after five 
years. It may also be amended before the expiration of that time period, in which case the five 
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year term will restart. Any renewal or amendment will require the patient to complete all the 
formal steps required to execute a binding directive anew, including obtaining medical advice 
and legal instruction and paying the corresponding fees once again.  
A common theme in the literature recognises that advance directives may fail to 
continue to represent the patient’s wishes on the basis of gains in medical science which 
occur after the directive was written and that a person’s values, and indeed the importance 
one attaches to those values, may change over time. This clearly influenced the Austrian 
legislature and as the explanatory notes suggest, the fact that renewal is required within five 
years enables the doctor to make the individual aware of relevant advances in medical science 
and new treatment alternatives. Whilst medical advances may justify the need for renewal, 
and making renewal contingent upon medical advice, they do not appear to justify the need 
for further legal instruction upon the consequences of an advance directive. Moreover, §10 II 
PatVG specifically states that an advance directive will be invalid if significant changes in 
medical science occur after the directive has been created. This is clearly intended to exclude 
the binding force of directives where the medical advice provided could not consider medical 
advances that have occurred in the intervening period, thus the requirement to renew every 
five years cannot be based solely on the need for a directive to reflect the current standing of 
medical science. Worryingly, the fact that both medical and legal advice must be sought prior 
to the amendment of an existing directive, may in fact lead to directives not reflecting the 
patient’s wishes, simply because the additional cost may act as a disincentive to making what 
may be a relatively minor amendment. 
Any advance directive that does not fulfil all of the above criteria will not be binding, 
rather it will be classified as a ‘consider-able’111 directive and will merely fall to be 
considered in the determination of the patient’s presumed will.112 Nevertheless, as §9 PatVG 
makes clear, a directive that should be considered, but that is not binding, is not worthless, 
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rather its degree of influence is dependent upon the extent to which it complies with the 
requirements of a binding directive. Therefore, if a patient’s directive has lapsed due to non-
renewal within the proscribed five year period, but that time limit has only just passed, a now 
‘consider-able’ directive will have significant influence upon the determination of the 
patient’s will, in fact it would perhaps best be described as being ‘almost binding’! However, 
the fewer of the procedural requirements that are abided by in a ‘consider-able’ directive, the 
less influence it will have. Consequently a directive issued without medical or legal advice 
may have only a limited impact upon the determination of a patient’s presumed will where it 
is simply one of the factors to be considered.  
Where a valid and applicable binding directive exists, doctors will be bound by that 
directive and a guardian cannot be appointed to make the decision in place of the patient,113 
rather the doctor should simply implement the refusal as a binding and effective expression of 
the patient’s will. Without a valid and applicable binding directive a guardian must be 
appointed by the court114 and must consent or refuse consent to treatment on behalf of the 
patient. The guardian must determine the patient’s presumed will and ‘consider-able’ 
directives will constitute important evidence of what the patient is likely to have wanted. 
However, the guardian is required to promote the patient’s welfare115 and a difficult arises 
where the patient’s current interests conflict with her previously expressed wishes. It is 
conceivable that a non-binding, but ‘consider-able’ refusal of life-sustaining treatment could 
be overridden by the guardian on the basis of promoting the patient’s current welfare.116 In 
such a case, as the treatment will have serious implications for the patient’s bodily integrity, 
the guardian will be required to gain court approval of her consent to treatment, §283 II 
ABGB, although somewhat surprisingly there is no corresponding requirement of court 
approval for a refusal to consent to life-sustaining treatment.117  
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In summary, the Austrian Act provides individuals with capacity with the opportunity 
to execute a binding advance directive, but the vast majority of advance directives will, due 
to the fact they have to anticipate the unknown, fail to meet the specificity requirement and so 
inevitably be classified as directives that must merely be considered as part of the patient’s 
presumed will rather than binding directives. The Act adopts a very conservative and 
essentially paternalistic approach to anticipatory decision-making—advance refusals will 
only be binding if the individual has had the consequences of her decisions explained to her 
by both a doctor and a lawyer. The  patient is, therefore, infantilised and treated as in need of 
protection from her own ill-thought out decisions. A further criticism of the Austrian Act is 
that it prioritises form over content, with binding effect only being awarded to those advance 
directives that meet the tri-requirements of information, form and time limit. However the 
binding directive comes at a high price, with figures of up to 800 Euros being quoted for the 
medical and legal advice,118 raising serious questions about social justice and rendering the 
ability to make a binding advance directive a privilege rather than a right.  
 
II COMPARATIVE REFLECTIONS119 
 
Each of the three jurisdictions recognise the right of an adult patient with capacity to 
refuse medical treatment, including life-sustaining medical treatment, but in enacting 
legislation to extend that right of refusal to anticipatory decisions the three jurisdictions have 
had to confront the problem of how to balance the sanctity of life and the right to self-
determination without undermining the utility of advance directives. In seeking to achieve 
that balance the three Acts adopt different mechanisms. . The English Act sets out a minimal 
regulatory framework, leaving the attending doctor to determine whether or not the patient’s 
advance decision is valid and applicable. At the other end of the scale, the Austrian Act 
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adopts a very detailed approach imposing stringent pre-requisites upon the creation of a 
binding advance directive. This significantly reduces the scope for the resultant advance 
directive to be considered invalid or inapplicable, but simultaneously severely restricts an 
individual’s ability to execute a binding directive. The German law adopts the middle way, 
setting out some minimal requirements for a valid advance directive, but ultimately leaving 
the patient’s legal representative and doctor to determine together whether or not the advance 
directive constitutes a valid and applicable (refusal of) consent to treatment.  
The three legislative responses were introduced amid statements of support for 
precedent autonomy, respect for self-determination and the need to empower those who lack 
capacity to decide for themselves. However, upon consideration of the impact of the 
safeguards adopted by the three Acts it becomes clear that the rhetoric of respect for 
precedent autonomy is at best superficial and that the key achievement of the legislation is 
the protection of medical discretion.  
 
a) Initial validity and applicability 
 
i) The requirement of capacity 
 
We have seen that there is significant common ground between the three Acts, 
reflecting the common values and social contexts in which they operate. Each of the Acts 
requires that the individual has the necessary capacity to consent or refuse the specified 
treatment at the time of drafting the advance directive. A functional approach to capacity is 
taken rather than full legal capacity being required. In each jurisdiction, therefore, the 
individual must be able to satisfy both the cognitive and voluntary elements of decision-
making and be able to communicate her decision. Similarly, each jurisdiction adopts the 
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position that every adult is presumed to have capacity and that the burden of proof falls upon 
those seeking to suggest the contrary. However, this presumption appears to operate in 
reverse when applied to the anticipatory decision-making context as each of the Acts requires 
that the person implementing the decision (the doctor, or in Germany the legal representative 
together with the doctor) be satisfied that the patient had capacity at the time of making the 
advance decision. This raises a clear practical problem that does not arise in relation to 
contemporaneous decisions, namely that doubts as to the patient’s previous capacity arise at a 
time where she is no longer able to demonstrate that the requisite capacity existed. For this 
reason, the Austrian approach of requiring a doctor to certify capacity at the time of drafting 
should be regarded as an important safeguard of the individual’s ability to exercise precedent 
autonomy as it eliminates any doubt about this issue.  
Of the three jurisdictions considered, only Austria permits a mature minor to execute 
an advance directive. This reflects the paternalistic attitude adopted by the courts in England 
and Germany towards minors where a minor’s refusal of consent may be overridden by a 
parental responsibility holder, or the court, reflecting the view that minors need greater 
protection from their own wishes and that therefore the balance to be struck between self-
determination and the protection of life falls firmly on the side of the latter. This stance is, 
however, problematic because mature minors are likely to be able to fulfil the capacity 
criteria set out above. It could even be suggested that the discrepancy between the approach 
taken towards mature minors and adults may be attributed not to a lack of cognitive capacity, 
but rather to a perceived lack of experience that would enable the minor to exercise that 
cognitive capacity and provide well-founded reasons for her decision. 
The suggested need for a well-founded refusal of treatment may also be applied to 
adults in the context of advance refusals of treatment. However, the imposition of a 
requirement to give reasons for an anticipatory refusal would stand in stark contrast to the 
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well-recognised right of an adult with capacity to refuse medical treatment, including life-
sustaining treatment ‘whether the reasons for making that choice are rational, irrational, 
unknown or even non-existent,’120 a right that is recognised in each of the jurisdictions. 
Nevertheless, as discussed above, in the context of anticipatory decision-making the Austrian 
Act takes a much more restrictive view, requiring individuals to explain the reason for their 
advance refusal of particular treatments.  Although the consulting doctor is not entitled to 
consider those reasons in determining whether or not the individual has the requisite capacity 
to make such a refusal per se, she must certify that the individual is able to correctly 
comprehend the consequences of her decision. Therefore, where the reasons provided do not, 
in the eyes of the certifying doctor, appear sufficient, it is unlikely that she will consider the 
individual to have correctly understood the consequences of her decision, thus excluding the 
possibility of the patient making a binding advance directive. This is likely to be significant 
because, with the exception of religious based refusals of treatment, the example reasons 
provided in the Austrian Act and explanatory notes thereto, suggest a very limited basis upon 
which individuals will be able to refuse treatment, namely on the basis of personal or 
professional experience of particular conditions.  
As noted above, the experience referred to in the Austrian Act may be observational, 
rather than participatory, in the sense that it may relate to the experience of a close relative.  
A narrower variant of this approach was considered in the English case of Ms B,121 where the 
relevance of experience was considered in the context of a contemporaneous refusal of 
treatment. Ms B became a tetraplegic following an intramedullary cervical spine cavernoma, 
and was dependent upon a ventilator; the court considered whether she had the capacity to 
refuse consent to continued ventilation. The consultant surgeon in spinal injuries accepted 
that Ms B had capacity, but argued that her ability to give an effective refusal of consent was 
undermined by the fact that she had not experienced a spinal rehabilitation unit.  He 
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suggested that such an experience could offer her a much more positive view of the quality of 
life she might attain. However, Dame Butler-Sloss P. rejected this argument, holding that if it 
‘were correct, the absence of experience in the spinal rehabilitation clinic would deny Ms B 
… the right to choose whether or not to go to one. It is not possible to experience before 
choosing in many medical situations.’122 It is submitted that this approach, rejecting the need 
for a decision to be based upon experience, is correct and that, despite the slightly broader 
context of relevant experience envisaged by the Austrian Act, the requirement that the 
consulting doctor effectively approve the reasoning behind an anticipatory refusal of 
treatment is overly paternalistic in outlook. Nevertheless, the noting of reasons given may 
well be of assistance in interpreting the advance directive when the time comes for 
implementation. Thus, there is a strong argument that each of the Acts takes too limited an 
approach to advance directives by not recommending that the individual include a values 
statement within her advance directive setting out the values that guide her own decision-
making and that should be applied in interpreting the advance decision.  
 
ii) The permissible scope of anticipatory decision-making 
 
In common with contemporaneous decision-making, the limits of what medical care 
can be refused in each jurisdiction are dependent, firstly, upon that care being lawfully 
available to the patient and, secondly, upon the treatment in question being clinically 
indicated. An advance directive cannot refuse treatment that is required by law (typically 
treatment for a mental disorder), or request ‘treatment’ that is unlawful. Thus, each 
jurisdiction has stressed that an advance directive cannot be used to make a request for 
assistance in dying which is prohibited in each country.123 It could be suggested that the 
asymmetries between an anticipatory and a contemporaneous refusal require the state to 
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express a preference for life by restricting anticipatory decision-making to, for example, those 
suffering from a terminal illness. Thus, the German Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry 
echoed the Bundesgerichtshof (Civil Division) in recommending that advance directives 
should only be applicable where the underlying illness would irreversibly lead to death. It 
argued that that such a restriction was necessary as part of the state’s duty to protect life and 
to minimise the potential for abuse, characterising the restriction as a limit on the ability of 
the individual to bind herself, rather than a limit on self-determination per se.124 
Such extent clauses are susceptible to well-founded criticism at a number of levels. At 
the practical level, immense difficulties arise due to the difficulty in defining ‘terminal 
illness’125 and what will constitute an ‘underlying condition that will irreversibly lead to 
death.’ Such a restriction would also exclude many of the conditions in which people are 
likely to want an anticipatory refusal of treatment to apply, including religious-based refusals 
of blood and treatment refusals in conditions such as an apallic state, an irreversible coma and 
dementia It is settled law that the withdrawal or withholding of treatment consistent with the 
patient’s best interests/presumed will or her refusal of treatment will not violate the state’s 
duty to protect life and that there is no duty to keep a patient alive by all possible means.126 
Therefore, there can be no justification for restricting anticipatory decisions to terminal 
conditions based upon the state’s duty to protect life, excluding all consideration of the 
patient’s right to self-determination. It is suggested that the three legislatures were correct to 
recognise that such a restriction would be disproportionate and unnecessary in order to 
protect life, permitting anticipatory decisions to be made in relation to any kind of (lawful) 
treatment, to apply during any phase of life. 
The parameters of a valid anticipatory decision are established by each of the Acts by 
reference to clinical indications, excluding the possibility of a patient using an advance 
directive to mandate non-indicated treatment and emphasising that the doctor’s role is not 
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limited to that of ‘body mechanic.’127 The courts in each jurisdiction have accepted that the 
ability to provide treatment does not mean that it should necessarily be provided,128 but there 
is a significant amount of discretion left to doctors to determine what treatment is indicated. 
Whilst subject to professional standards, this assessment is not entirely objective as it will 
also be determined by the doctor’s own subjective assessment of the benefits and burdens of 
the treatment in question and of what constitutes an acceptable quality of life. Therefore, this 
preliminary assessment may pose a substantial limit on the patient’s autonomy as it will set 
the parameters for the permissible exercise of self-determination, excluding the possibility of 
what Brock refers to as ‘consumer sovereignty’129 whereby doctors are simply required to 
implement orders given to them by patients.  
 
iii) The need for specificity 
 
As Buchanan and Brock recognised, a specific refusal of treatment may need to be 
applied to a very different clinical situation to that envisaged by the individual at the time of 
drafting.130 To address this problem, each Act requires that the advance refusal fulfil the 
applicability criteria, namely, the decision must relate to the specific treatment offered by the 
doctor as clinically indicated and must be drafted to operate in the situation that occurs. This 
dual-specificity requirement reflects the common law requirements131 and is likely to be the 
greatest obstacle to be overcome in drafting an advance directive given the temporal distance 
between the drafting and the implementation thereof. In cases where individuals are suffering 
from a disease with a well-established prognosis, such as motor neurone disease or cerebellar 
ataxia, the range of treatment options and treatment scenarios (as least in relation to that 
disease) should be capable of relatively precise definition. However, other directives, where 
the individual is not suffering from such a disease, are likely to be much more general in 
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nature. It would be unreasonable to expect an advance directive to contain a comprehensive 
list of treatments to be refused in all possible treatment scenarios, but it is clear that vague 
statements such as ‘no heroic measures’ will not suffice. It could be suggested that a refusal 
of ‘all medical care’ might satisfy the specificity requirement,132 provided that the individual 
specified the circumstances in which such a decision were to operate, but it is far from clear 
that such a blanket refusal of treatment will be considered valid and applicable. Thus the key 
question in assessing the impact of this requirement upon the ability to make a binding 
anticipatory choice will be how specific does the refusal have to be? Each of the legislatures 
has left this question to be resolved by the attending doctor, or in Germany the doctor and 
patient’s legal representative, in determining whether or not the directive is applicable. The 
consequence of this solution is to increase medical discretion at the expense of promoting the 
effective exercise of precedent autonomy. 
The specificity requirement is likely to hamper many people wishing to create a 
binding advance directive. The recent study of the legal, ethical and practical experiences of 
the PatVG found that patients have real difficulty in fulfilling this requirement because they 
do not define what they consider to be a worthwhile quality of life in terms of medical 
parameters.133 Rather, individuals tend to refer to refusals being operative in situations 
‘inconsistent with meaningful life,’ or to utilise other such abstract concepts without 
providing more precise details of what they would consider a meaningful life. One safeguard 
available in contemporaneous decision-making is the provision of medical advice, affording 
doctors the opportunity to seek to persuade patients refusing treatment to at least try it, or to 
consider alternatives to a blanket refusal of treatment. Clearly that opportunity will not exist 
at the time when an advance directive is to be implemented, however one way to narrow the 
communication gap in anticipatory decision-making and to enable patients to provide at least 
a greater degree of specificity would be to require individuals to seek medical advice as a pre-
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condition to the creation of a binding advance directive. The provision of medical advice is 
important at two levels–firstly it could play a vital role in assisting patients to provide clear 
and applicable instructions about what treatment they want to refuse, in which circumstances. 
However, medical advice given in this situation can never completely fill the communication 
gap between the doctor and her patient as in any discussion relating to anticipatory decision-
making such advice will necessarily be directed towards hypothetical situations rather than 
the specific treatment scenario that would be considered in contemporaneous decision-
making. Nevertheless, a secondary benefit is that the advising doctor may be able to elucidate 
the patient’s directive and assist in applying it to her current situation when the time for 
implementation arises.  
There can be little doubt that the provision of medical advice is desirable and that it 
should improve the quality of anticipatory decision-making. As discussed above, medical 
advice forms a key requirement for the creation of a binding directive in the PatVG. 
However, given that a patient with capacity can make a valid refusal of consent without 
having to be informed of the medical consequences, the requirement imposed by the Austrian 
Act represents a significant limitation upon an individual’s right to exercise her self-
determination in advance of incapacity, particularly as the cost of that medical advice is not 
met by health insurance, a point which is considered further below. For that reason it is 
submitted that both the Westminster and Berlin legislatures correctly rejected proposals that 
mandatory medical advice be provided to the patient, whilst recommending that patients 
should seek such advice.134 
 
iv) The form requirement 
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In addition to the requirements noted above, to be valid and applicable the advance 
directive must not be based on a defect of consent (for example duress)135 and must conform 
to the form requirements imposed by the Acts. The first requirement applies equally to 
contemporaneous decisions, but as discussed above, each of the Acts imposes form 
requirements upon anticipatory refusals of life-sustaining treatment. The German and English 
courts had stressed that clear evidence would be required of anticipatory decisions, but 
neither had suggested that their validity would be dependent upon them being set down in 
writing. Although the imposition of a form requirement does constitute a limit on the 
individual’s ability to exercise her self-determination in anticipation of incapacity, it is 
submitted that the intrusion is proportionate to the benefits in terms of providing clear 
evidence of the individual’s wishes, without raising issues of hearsay evidence, and in 
underlining the fact that an advance directive represents a considered decision. However, the 
imposition of a duty to execute an advance directive before a lawyer, as required by the 
PatVG, appears entirely disproportionate to this aim. The imposition of such a duty cannot be 
based upon the need for legal advice as to the consequences of an advance directive–if the 
individual does not understand those consequences she arguably lacks the capacity to 
exercise precedent autonomy. In any case the determination of capacity and provision of 
medical advice concerning the terminology used and the implications of the directive are 
tasks better suited to a doctor than a lawyer. Therefore, it is submitted that the Austrian 
requirement that advance directives be drawn up subject to legal advice is misguided, serving 
only to increase the cost of making a binding advance directive without conferring a 
commensurate benefit upon the patient. 
 





Each of the three Acts makes express provision for the individual’s ability to revoke 
an advance directive in any manner. Thus, whereas a valid anticipatory refusal of life-
sustaining treatment must be set down in a written instrument, it can be revoked orally, in 
writing, or simply through behaviour. Whilst s.24(3) MCA 2005 states that revocation 
requires capacity, the notes to the PatVG (but not the Act itself) state that capacity is not 
required, and the amended BGB does not address the issue of capacity in relation to the 
revocation of an advance directive. It cannot be the case that capacity is required to execute a 
valid directive, but be irrelevant when the same directive is to be revoked, therefore it is 
submitted that at least a limited degree of capacity will be required to revoke a directive in 
each jurisdiction.136 Given that capacity is decision-specific and that the degree of capacity 
required depends upon the gravity of the decision, it is to be expected that a much lower level 
of capacity will suffice to revoke an anticipatory refusal of life-sustaining treatment. Such an 
understanding of the capacity requirement would support the preference for life, but also 
supports the principle of self-determination by requiring at least a minimal level of capacity 
to revoke anticipatory decisions made with capacity. 
 
ii) Invalidity resulting from a change of circumstance 
 
Even if the patient has not revoked her advance directive, the continuing validity of 
her directive must be assessed as each Act makes provision for the advance directive to be 
invalidated by a change of circumstance indicating that the directive no longer represents the 
patient’s fixed decision.137 The potential invalidity resulting from a change of circumstance 
has great potential to undermine anticipatory decision-making. Indeed it may be suggested 
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that any doubt as to whether the directive continues to reflect the patient’s wishes will suffice 
to invalidate it. A good example of a case where it was held that an advance directive could 
no longer be regarded as clearly representing the patient’s wishes is provided by the English 
case HE v A Hospital NHS Trust, AE.138 This case was heard prior to the enactment of the 
MCA, but the advance directive satisfies the more stringent requirements introduced by that 
Act, namely, it was in writing and specifically stated that the advance refusal of blood was to 
apply even if life was at risk. However, AE’s father argued that the directive no longer 
represented her will due to a recent faith conversion. Munby J. held that anyone wishing to 
assert that a directive is no longer operative would have to ‘point to something that this is or 
may be so,’139 but that once doubts were raised those seeking to rely upon the directive bore 
the burden of proof as ‘the continuing validity and applicability of the advance directive must 
be clearly established by convincing and inherently reliable evidence.’140 Munby J. found that 
AE’s directive was based on her faith and that as doubts had been raised about whether or not 
she still subscribed to the same religious views doubts as to the continuing validity and 
applicability of her directive fell to be resolved in favour of the preservation of life.141  
This case demonstrates how difficult it may be to determine whether or not an 
advance directive still reflects the will of a patient who lacks capacity and so is unable to 
demonstrate that it does just that. The judge required ‘clear and convincing evidence’ of the 
continuing validity and applicability of the directive, a much higher standard of proof than 
that of the balance of probabilities normally required in civil matters.142 Conversely the 
antithesis of this standard appears to have been applied to evidence suggesting that the 
directive was invalid, whereby it appears to have been sufficient to adduce doubts as to her 
continued faith. The clear and convincing standard is typically used in the USA in the 
substituted judgment approach to decision-making, where a patient’s friends and family are 
required to give clear and convincing evidence of what the patient would want, referring for 
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example to oral statements made in the past.143 However, it is submitted that Munby J. failed 
to recognise that such a situation is inherently different to that which exists where an 
individual has taken the time and trouble to draft a clearly formulated advance refusal of 
specific treatments. AE had herself alerted doctors to her refusal of blood as late as 
November 2002; she continued attending Witness meetings until January 2003, despite 
agreeing to renounce her faith as a condition of marrying a Muslim man in December 2002. 
On that basis, it is submitted that there should have been significant doubts about the validity 
of this alleged change of faith, or at least as to its voluntariness when the doubts were raised 
in May 2003.  
Consideration must also be given to what material circumstances will give rise to 
sufficient doubt as to override the clear and otherwise valid and applicable advance directive. 
Munby J. suggested that marrying or having children might create such a changed 
circumstance;144 similarly Spickhoff145 argues that pregnancy might constitute a changed 
circumstance and Balz146 contends that founding a family after drafting the directive might 
suffice, suggesting that any material change in circumstance may cast doubt upon the 
continuing validity of the directive. In each of these examples the change relates to a new, 
legal, relationship to somebody else being created, in the case of pregnancy a future 
relationship to the child yet to be born. However, particularly in the case of a religious-based 
objection such a change in circumstances is unlikely to affect the patient’s refusal of 
treatment; in other cases the impact of overriding her anticipatory refusal will need to be 
carefully assessed in the circumstances.  
Whilst it is surely correct to say that existing doubts should be raised, such doubts 
must be subjected to a stringent burden of proof, being required to clearly show that the 
patient no longer intended the directive to apply, otherwise the individual’s right to self-
determination will become worthless as soon as she lacks the capacity to demonstrate her 
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continuing wishes. Spickhoff considers the example of a pregnant woman injured in an 
accident and in a serious condition with a poor prognosis. He argues that her advance 
directive refusing all forms of intensive care should be disregarded due to the fact that it was 
drafted prior to her becoming pregnant.147 However, it is submitted that in such a scenario the 
fact she has become pregnant does not in itself raise sufficient doubts about the validity of her 
directive. Instead it must be considered whether there is evidence that she, as opposed to the 
‘reasonable woman,’ would have wanted her directive not to be followed in these 
circumstances. It must be accepted that pregnancy raises different problems to the fact of 
simply getting married or founding a family and that pregnancy may constitute a material 
change of circumstance, a suggestion also made by both the Law Commission148 and in the 
MCA Code of Practice.149 In such a situation, it would be possible to argue that the patient 
would have wanted to be kept alive for as long as was necessary to sustain the pregnancy 
until the child could be delivered. However, as the English courts have made clear in cases 
concerning court-ordered obstetric intervention, pregnancy is not a justification for overriding 
a woman’s autonomy:  
 
While pregnancy increases the personal responsibilities of a woman it does not 
diminish her entitlement to decide whether or not to undergo medical treatment … 
The infringement of the mother’s autonomy could not, therefore, be justified by the 
perceived needs of the foetus. 150  
 
Thus, pregnancy should not automatically invalidate a woman’s advance directive and 
it is submitted that a presumption should operate to that effect. If, however, there is clear and 
cogent evidence that she would have wished to receive treatment to enable the pregnancy to 
continue to term, implementation of the advance directive could be postponed until the child 
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is delivered. Ultimately, whatever the nature of the change in circumstance, in stressing the 
need for certainty about the continuing validity of an advance directive great care must be 
taken not to subvert the utility of an advance directive. Furthermore, if the change of 
circumstance is held to invalidate the patient’s advance directive, it must be borne in mind 
that the interests to be considered in assessing her best interests, or presumed will, are her 
own, not those of her foetus, her existing children, or indeed her spouse. 
As Buchanan and Brock note, the fact that an individual’s interests may be radically 
and unforeseeably different from those anticipated significantly weakens the argument for 
precedent autonomy.151 This is particularly relevant to a very difficult variation of the 
changed circumstances issue which has received much attention in the literature152 although it 
has not arisen for decision by a court in any of the three jurisdictions under consideration—
namely, whether signs of enjoying life in a severely demented patient should be taken to have 
invalidated her directive refusing treatment once the dementia became severe. Whilst the 
three Acts arguably require at least a limited degree of capacity in order to revoke an advance 
directive, none of the Acts refer to a need for the patient to have capacity when a change in 
circumstance occurs potentially invalidating an advance directive. Therefore it may be 
suggested that in the case of dementia, the fact that the patient lacks the requisite capacity to 
revoke her advance directive does not exclude the possibility that she may be taken to have 
invalidated her advance directive through showing signs of contentment. In such 
circumstances it is argued that the interests of the now severely demented patient (P2) are not 
the same as those she held as an individual with capacity (P1), and indeed it may be argued 
that the demented patient is a very different person to the person she was before due to the 
loss of psychological continuity.153  
Dresser argues that because the interests of the demented patient differ dramatically 
from those she held before, advance directives should not be the overriding factor in 
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determining whether treatment should be provided and that the patient should be treated in 
accordance with her best interests rather than being subjected to the paternalistic views held 
by her former self.154 If an advance directive is invalidated in such circumstances the 
consideration of the patient’s best interests/welfare will focus primarily upon her current 
situation, concentrating upon the perceived quality of her life and the benefits and burdens of 
the proposed medical treatment. Such an assessment prioritises the patient’s current physical 
interests rather than recognising her as a person with interests and values that transcend 
dementia. It is undeniable that individuals may well underestimate the quality of life that they 
may enjoy at a future time of incapacity, but engaging in bifurcation of the individual does 
not resolve this issue. P2 shares the same body as P1, P2 is regarded as the same person by 
her family, albeit a demented version of P1, and so it is submitted that a unitary approach 
must be taken, that it must be accepted that all lives go through differing phases and that each 
phase, including a demented phase, is simply part of the same life. Therefore, as Dworkin 
argues, critical interests, those interests that make each person an individual, their innermost 
beliefs and values about the circumstances in which they would wish to be treated, must be 
the determinative interests that survive incapacity, trumping current experiential interests.155  
The particular challenge presented by dementia cases brings the conflict between the 
right to self-determination, the sanctity of life and respect for human dignity into sharp focus 
and while there are no simple answers, it is suggested that the recommendation of the 
German National Ethics Council should be adopted in each jurisdiction. The Ethics Council 
recommended that signs of a will to live in dementia cases should override an advance refusal 
unless four cumulative requirements are fulfilled: the treatment scenario is described in 
sufficiently concrete terms; the directive is in writing or comparably reliably documented; the 
directive was drafted following appropriate medical advice; and the directive explicitly states 
that signs of a will to live should be disregarded.156 In each of the jurisdictions the first two 
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conditions will be met by a valid advance decision, but the requirement of appropriate advice 
preceding the drafting of the directive is only required by the Austrian legislation and an 
explicit statement rejecting signs of willingness to live would be required. It is submitted that 
adopting the Ethics Council’s recommendation provides the best way forward in this situation 
and that if an advance directive is drafted following medical advice and explicitly states that 
signs of a willingness to live should be disregarded, the advance directive should remain 
valid and be implemented. This approach would reflect respect for the sanctity of life, but 
would prioritise self-determination and respect for human dignity in cases where the 
individual has made a clear decision about the way in which she wishes to live, or rather not 
live. Such decisions depend both upon the individual’s perception of herself as a person and 
upon the way in which she wishes others to perceive her. Adoption of the Ethics Council’s 
recommendation would recognise that the individual with capacity is the most appropriate 
person to determine what treatment she would want in the case of severe dementia, rather 
than leaving the decision to third parties to determine under an assessment of her best 
interests or presumed will. As the European Court of Human Rights recognised in Pretty v 
UK ‘the way she chooses to pass the closing moments of her life is part of the act of living, 
and she has a right to ask that this too must be respected.’ 157 
A final change in circumstance must be considered, namely the potential for advances 
in medical science to undermine an advance directive, rendering it invalid in each of the three 
jurisdictions.158 It is submitted that advances in medical science can only intervene to 
invalidate an advance directive where the advances are significant and undermine the entire 
basis of the decision to refuse treatment, for example where a cure has become available, or a 
new or improved treatment could substantially improve the patient’s quality of life; a change 





In order to anticipate relevant changes in circumstance of whichever variety 
individuals should be encouraged to review their advance directive regularly. Of the three 
Acts only the PatVG makes the validity of an advance directive contingent upon renewal, and 
does so at five-yearly intervals, intervals which are too long given the pace of change in 
medical science and indeed the scope for invalidity based upon other changed circumstances. 
Moreover, the fact that the Austrian Act makes the validity of a renewed directive contingent 
upon compliance with the requirements of medical and legal advice, both of which may lead 
to the incurrence of substantial financial cost, is particularly problematic. Given the need for 
an advance directive to reflect the individual’s will, it is suggested that the financial 
disincentive to amend the directive during the five year period threatens to undermine the 
validity of the regulatory scheme adopted, a scheme based upon ensuring that an advance 
refusal of treatment reflects the patient’s wishes, is well-considered and based upon 
comprehensive medical information.  
When considering the need for renewal a balance needs to be struck between the need 
to protect life and the need to recognise the individual’s right to self-determination. On the 
one hand requiring individuals to renew their advance directives does impose a burden upon 
them and restricting the validity of advance directives to those renewed regularly would 
constitute a significant restriction upon their ability to exercise precedent autonomy. On the 
other hand, recommending that advance directives be regularly updated takes account of the 
importance of renewal, whilst respecting the individual’s autonomy, thus the approach 
adopted by the German and English legislation is to be preferred. Although a 
recommendation to renew is proportionate to the aim of ensuring that an advance directive 
continues to reflect the fixed will of the individual, the same cannot be said of the time-
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limited approach adopted by the Austrian legislation, whereby an advance directive will 
automatically lapse after 5 years, unless the individual lacks the capacity to renew it. Just as a 
contemporary decision remains valid until such time as the patient withdraws it, an 
anticipatory decision should not automatically lapse simply because of the passage of time, 
without regard being had to whether the individual’s circumstances, medical or otherwise, 
have changed. 
 
3) The failure to provide mechanisms to support the effective exercise of precedent 
autonomy 
 
In seeking to demonstrate deference to the principle of in dubio pro vita, each Act has 
created significant procedural requirements that must be met in order to construct a valid and 
applicable directive, yet none have provided the necessary mechanisms to support 
anticipatory decision-making. There is little point in drafting an advance directive, if the 
attending doctor is unable to check quickly and reliably whether or not an advance directive 
exists and then act accordingly. In each jurisdiction patients are advised to lodge a copy of 
their advance directive with their GP, who should record it in the patient’s notes.159 Whether 
this allows an advance directive to be located will depend on the attending doctor knowing 
that such a document exists and may occasion some delay in gaining access. Similarly, the 
suggestion that patients should give copies to their solicitor, family and others who might be 
approached regarding the existence of an advance directive, fails to overcome the problem 
whereby the patient who lacks capacity bears the responsibility for ensuring that her advance 
directive is effectively communicated to the attending doctor. Furthermore, as advance 
directives may be amended or revoked, there is a need for a single authoritative version and 
the existence of copies makes the possibility of conflicting directives being brought to the 
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attention of the attending doctor all too real, leading to a position where it will be difficult, if 
not impossible, to determine which version represents the settled will of the patient.  
If patients are to be able to effectively exercise their precedent autonomy, a central 
electronic register of advance directives, containing the authoritative text of that directive, 
must be created and be accessible to all healthcare professionals and a corresponding duty to 
consult the register must be created. In Austria, an example of just such a register exists, but 
in a different context, namely the opt-out register for organ donors and a corresponding duty 
is imposed upon doctors to check the register before harvesting organs.160 Four years after the 
PatVG came into force there is still no similar central register for advance directives in 
Austria;  and neither Germany nor England have made the necessary provision for such a 
register. The failure to establish a central register to allow advance directives to be 
conclusively located, coupled with a corresponding duty imposed upon the doctor to check 
the register, renders the ability to make an advance directive of limited utility.  
Similarly, each of the legislatures recognised that medical advice prior to the drafting 
of an advance directive would be desirable, in the case of England and Germany it is 
recommended, in Austria it is a pre-requisite to the creation of a binding directive. However, 
none of the jurisdictions have made provision to make this medical service available to 
patients without charge. A doctor can legitimately be expected to provide advice to a patient 
known to be suffering from a particular disease about her prognosis and likely treatment 
options. However, the broader nature of the information required for advance directives not 
associated with a particular disease, together with a capacity assessment will not be covered 
by health insurance in Germany and Austria, nor, as the BMA has confirmed, will they 
constitute ‘a primary medical service’ in England161 and thus a fee will be payable in each 
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, if we accept that medical advice should precede the drafting of an 
advance directive, social justice demands that the ability (or in the case of Austria the right) 
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The three considered Acts clearly demonstrate the asymmetries between anticipatory 
and contemporaneous decision-making. The requirements imposed for an advance directive 
to be considered binding illustrate an extremely conservative, paternalistic conception of the 
doctor-patient relationship. This means that in all but the clearest of advance directives, an 
advance refusal will simply be a factor to be considered in determining the patient’s best 
interests/presumed will, prioritising the patient’s current welfare, rather than her anticipatory 
decisions.  
In each jurisdiction the legislative measure has not removed uncertainties, particularly 
in relation to determining whether the advance directive is sufficiently specific to be 
applicable to the treatment and treatment scenario in question, and what will constitute a 
sufficient change of circumstance to invalidate a directive. By contrast, considerable clarity 
has been created for doctors—in all but the clearest of circumstances doctors will be justified 
in treating patients not withstanding an advance directive refusing treatment due to the scope 
of their discretion to determine the validity and applicability of an advance directive. Thus, 
each Act fails to truly locate decision-making authority in the individual concerned, instead, 
in each case significant discretion is left to the doctor, or in the case of Germany to the doctor 
and the patient’s legal representative, to determine the validity and applicability of the 
advance directive. It is unquestionably correct that the exercise of this discretion is subject to 
review by the courts in each jurisdiction, but such control has to be instigated and will only 
come into play when somebody disagrees with the decision-maker. For that reason it is 
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suggested that the German approach requiring dialogue between the doctor and the patient’s 
Betreuer or Bevollmächtigte (together with the patient’s family and friends where time 
allows) has much to recommend it, particularly as it avoids the situation that arises in Austria 
and England whereby the doctor(s) must determine what medical treatment is indicated, then 
determine whether or not the advance directive allows her to administer the treatment she 
thinks should be provided!  
Due to the limitations imposed upon the effective exercise of precedent autonomy by 
the need for specificity and the doubts that may be created by a change of circumstance, it is 
suggested that each of the Acts would benefit from the inclusion of a requirement that in 
conjunction with drafting an advance directive the patient must donate a lasting power of 
attorney and draft a values statement setting out her critical interests and what she considers 
to be an adequate quality of life. The proxy should be required to implement a valid and 
applicable directive, but in cases where the directive is not applicable, due either to a change 
of circumstance, or to inapplicability to the treatment or the treatment scenario, the proxy 
should consent or refuse consent to treatment on the basis of what the patient would have 
wanted as outlined in her values statement. Clearly the second alternative is less satisfactory 
than simply executing the patient’s directive, but it does at least attempt to ensure that the 
patient’s wishes and values determine the treatment given. Due to the fact that the 
determination of what the patient would have wanted is a subjective decision, it is argued that 
this is best suited to a LPA, rather than a court appointed guardian because the patient herself 
must entrust the LPA with the authority to make such decisions, indicating the existence of a 
relationship based upon a high degree of trust. Similarly, given that the patient has chosen to 
entrust the LPA with such decisions, there seems little need for court approval in the usual 
course of events. In cases of suspected abuse healthcare professionals or family members 
could seek review of the LPA’s decision by the Court of Protection/Guardianship Court.  
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Therefore, it is suggested that each of the Acts needs to be reviewed. More clarity is 
required concerning how specifically both the treatment refused and the scope of that refusal 
must be defined in an advance directive. Provision needs to be made for patients to be able to 
access medical advice and capacity assessments regardless of ability to pay for them. A 
central electronic register of advance directives needs to be created, at least at the national 
level, with a corresponding duty placed on doctors to check that register before giving 
treatment, absent an emergency situation. The recommendations of the German National 
Ethics Council should be implemented in relation to dementia cases. And, finally, individuals 
should be required to donate a lasting power of attorney with responsibility for interpreting 
and implementing the advance directive.  
Upon consideration of the three Acts it is clear that although each Act could be 
considered a step in the right direction, in their current formats they have each failed to 
achieve the stated aims of providing clarity and recognising the right to make effective 
anticipatory choices. In attempting to balance the protection of life against the right to self-
determination the legislatures in Berlin, Vienna and Westminster have imposed stringent 
requirements upon the making of an advance directive intended to be binding, and granted a 
wide degree of discretion to the ultimate decision maker, the person charged with 
determining whether or not the directive is valid and applicable. In so doing, the resultant 
legislation has undermined the very concept of precedent autonomy, namely that an 
individual should be able to make advance choices directing future medical care in the case 
of incapacity and be able to rely on such choices being implemented, rather than being 
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